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ABSTRACT

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The ImpllcatlonB of resale price maintenance for the
public Interest continue to be Interpreted differently by
economists and businessmen.

As a result of the investigation

of the HaeQuarrie Committee in 1951, resale price maintenance
was banned unconditionally in Canada in the same year but
recently a retrenchment of the position occurred with the
amending of the Combines Investigation Act in I960.
An examination of the history of the practice within
modern retailing in the United Kingdom, the United States and
Canada reveals a difference in the legal approach by the govern*
ments concerned.

The more common arguments advanced in support

of resÊleoprlce maintenance fail in their objective when exam
ined in relation to the benefits accruing to the consumer.
The most prevalent aspect of these arguments, ^loss-leader"
competition, appears as an indeterminate concept because of
the inability of both economists and businessmen to arrive at
an acceptable definition.

Nevertheless these sane arguments

give some Insight into the motives of retailers, wholesalers
and manufacturers for desiring the use of resale price mainten
ance.

These motives evolve from the desire to either increase

or protect present profits.

Retailers who support the practice
li
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admittedly desire protection from price competition but their
reasons for entitlement to such protection fail to Indicate
any benefits for the consumer,

Manufacturers claim many

damaging aspects resulting from the use of their product as a
"loss-leader”, none of which are clearly substantiated.

It

appears that it is their profit margin which is damaged.
Resale price maintenance appears as detrimental to the
public interest.

It creates a favourable climate for price

agreements at the various distributive levels.

The consumer

is forced to pay a higher price than might otherwise have been
required if price competition were present.

In addition he is

made to pay for services which he may not desire end at the
same time is denied his right to influence the distribution
system thus retarding change in the structure of distribution.
As a result inefficient uses of resources occur both in distri
bution and in manufacturing.

ill
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PREFACE
Combine laws designed to protect the public from mono
polistic and restrictive practices exist in the greater major
ity of the countries of the western world. Because of the
dynamic quality of modern economic development the need exists
to fre(piently reexamine the relevance of such legislation to
the rapidly changing econttnic conditions.
Resale price maintenance is one topic relating to combine
law which has received increasing attention during recent times
in both North America and Western Europe.

There is no complet

ely settled position on the practice although a tendency in
one direction is spearing.
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the issues in
volved and to present a conclusion as to the position of the
practice.
In acknowledging my indebtedness to the members of my
thesis committee I wish particularly to thank the Chairman,
Professor W. J« Cillen for his patience and encouragement,
I am also grateful to Dr. W. G, Phillips and Dr. C, M, Birch
for their direction and timely suggestions.
To the staff of the University Library I owe a large debt
of gratitude for the cheerful way in which they filled my
every request for assistance.
iv
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Resale price maintenance is the term used to identify a
situation where a particular article la being resold by re
tailers, wholesalers or other distributors at either a fixed
price or at not less than a specified price.
The particular price may result from either of two
methods of agreement, horizontal or individual.

Horizontal

resale price maintenance exists where rival wholesalers or
manufacturers collectively agree on the resale price.

This

type of price fixing agreement is generally recognized as
being against the public interest and will not be discussed
in this paper.
Individual resale price maintenance results when an in
dividual supplier specifies a minimum or fixed price at which
a particular article is to be resold.

The manufacturer may

state the price at which all wholesalers will resell his pro
duct or a wholesaler may specify the price at which retailers
will resell a certain article.

In other instances an individ

ual manufacturer may specify the prices at both the wholesale
and retail level.

The arguments submitted herein will apply

to any of these arrangements.
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Individual resale price maintenance is associated pri
marily with branded or trade marked products,

"The purpose

of branding is to emphasize a distinction between a particu
lar article or class of articles and all other articles not
marked in the same way; it becomes effective when the public
Is aware of this distinction",^

The manufacturer of a bran

ded or trade marked product is in a position to undertake
national advertising stressing real or alleged differences
between his product and other comparable products with the
objective of creating a demand for it.
Enforcement of individual resale price policies will be
determined by existing legislation,

"Where the legislation

permits, suppliers may require distributors to sign contracts
agreeing to resell the product concerned at the indicated
price.

In some cases mere notifiction of the resale price

may be sufficient or the signing of a contract by one dis
tributor may automatically bind all other distributors.
Under such arrangements the supplier is then in a position to
take legal action against any distributors who do not resell
at the stated price.
Where legislation does not allow the supplier recourse
to legal action the opportunity may exist to attempt

1 Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance
Lloyd Jacob Committee (London, 1949) p. 3,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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enforcement of resale price maintenance by withholding sup
plies from distributors who resell below the

stated resale

price.2
With a policy of resale price maintenance the resale
price may be established as a minimum price below which the
article is not to be sold or it may be established as a fixed
price at which the article is to be sold.
tend to be the same in either case.

The result will

With a minimum resale

price the distributor will be inclined to sell at this price
as a result of competitive factors.

The more general ten

dency appears to be to specify fixed prices.
In the examination of the practice of resale price main
tenance the various stages of economic activity which connect
the producer with the consumer become involved.

Whereas tra

ditional economic theory is concerned mainly with a single
product situation involving manufacturing or agriculture.
2 "In 1926 the Owl drug chain operating on the Pacific
Coast defied the established policy of E, R. Squibb & dompany
by announcing that it would sell Squibb's products at cut
prices. This announcement precipitated a fight in which the
Squibb Company was alleged to have arranged with druggists
operating in the affected area to have them sell at cut prices,
but at margins equivalent to those formerly enjoyed. This
action, coupled with Squibb's refusal to sell to the Owl chain,
brought the latter to terms in early 1927". An excellent ex
ample of the possible action that may be open to manufacturers.
E. R. A. Seligraan and R. A, Love. Price Cutting and Price
Maintenance (New York, 1932) p. 39,
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retailing, on the other hand, presents a different combina
tion of factors which usually result in a multiple product
firm.

In addition the merging of the various stages of the

distributive system is not generally covered in traditional
theory,
The lack of any theoretical framework which can be di
rectly applied to resale price maintenance presents two al
ternatives in the method of approach to the topic.

One pos

sibility Involves the searching out of theoretical articles
which are applicable and from these attempt to establish a
model which fits resale price maintenance.

The second choice

consists of a more Inductive approach in which arguments are
examined and motives questioned in an effort to determine the
economic consequences of the practice and to derive an assess
ment of its Implications for the public interest.
The latter method has been chosen along with the result
ing limitations to the scope of this discussion.

As a con

sequence this thesis cannot answer all questions relating to
combines* law.
It is accepted that in general economists have a bias
toward price competition but at the same time reserve the
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right to make exceptions where the situation warrants it.3
As this is in keeping with traditional theory it Is therefore
accepted as given the principle that restrictions on competi
tion, price as well as otherstypes, are presumed against the
public interest unless proved otherwise.

Consequently the

reader will undoubtedly detect a bias toward price competition
In the arguments which follow.
Resale price maintenance io said to have been in exis
tence as far back as 200 B.C. but this discussion is concerned
with its more recent history dating from the latter part of
the nineteenth century and more particularly the developments
since the end of World War II,
In Chapter II the development of the practice within the
structure of modern retailing Is examined with reference to
the United (dngdom, the United States and Canada,

% e varied

reception of the practice by the governments of the three
countries la then outlined from the early twentieth century
up to the present date.
In attempting to establish the thesis that resale price
maintenance is detrimental to the public Interest it becomes
necessary to first examine the more common arguments presents*
3 Tlie existence of the argument against too perfect com
petition and its inhibiting effects on economic change aa
expressed by J, A, Schumpeter and others is acknowledged.
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in support of the practice*

Chapter III is devoted to such

an examination with a rebuttal extended to each argument
considered,
In the next chapter particular attention la focused on
the "loss-leader" argument which is an inherent part of the
major arguments rendered in support of resale price mainten
ance.

The attempt is made to examine and analyse all aspects

of "loss-leader" competition in arriving at a conclusion as
to the strength and validity of the argument.
Chapter V consists of an endeavour to gain an insight
into the underlying motives which may lead distributors to
support resale price maintenance followed by a discussion of
the possible economic effects that the practice may tend to
have on the distribution system of the economy.
The more recent development of strong support and in
some cases aggressive leadership originating with manufactur
ers requires a subsequent questioning of the possible motives
behind these actions and it is to this which Chapter VI Is
assigned along with the resulting economic Implications*
In conclusion the relevant points are examined in refer
ence to their effect upon the consumer and upon economic effl<ciency*

An effort is made to summarize the specific points

which support and illustrate the detrimental nature of resale
price maintenance.
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CHAPTER II

ORIGINS AND RECENT HISTORY
UNITED KINODOM. UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The movement to foster the more widespread use of resale
price maintenance appears to have gained significant impetus
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

The

growing price competition In many branches of retailing pro
vided the motivating force for the movement.
New types of retailing establishments were rapidly cut
ting into the trade of the small retailer.

Department and

chain stores, through their trading advantage, were able to
offer the pablic numerous and significant price reductions,
an attraction to which large sections of the public responded.
The competition provided by new methods of
retailing was superimposed uptm
probably more
leisurely ccxnpetition that existed among the typ
ical small-scale retailer of an earlier period.
The so-called 'legitimate* retailers (operating on
a small or medium scale along traditional lines)
felt the severe effects of the enhanced competition.
The smaller share of the trade that remained for
them had to ba transacted at lower prices and mar
gins of profit*^
The branding or trade-marking of merchandise became much
more prevalent during this period contributing to the severity
of retail competition.

By advertising, manufacturers of

1 B, S, Yamey "The Origins of Resale Price Maintenance;
A Study of Three Branches of Retail Trade", Economic Journal
LXII, p. 524.
7
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branded goods gained acceptance of their products by consumers
and this preselling contributed to minimizing the need for
specialized knowledge in retail selling.

With the branded or

trade marked products relatively easy to handle the largescale retailers could now use unskilled labour for the now
simplified function of selling.

The entry of new firms into

retailing was also made easier because of the reduced requir
ement for specialised knowledge.

Branding also led to compe

tition across product lines. Grocers could now sell tobacco
products or patent medicines, since no specialized knowledge
of the merchandise was necessary to sell the branded goods of
other trades.

Consequently the different retail trades began

to compete with each other.
The small and medium sized retailers operating along
traditional lines of specialization were hardest hit by this,
competition and ware forced to seek out methods to improve
their competitive position.

Some groups of small retailers

combined their purchases to secure the better terms which
their bulk-buying rivals enjoyed. Others joined together to
form trade organizations with one of the major objectives^
being to negotiate with manufacturers In an effort to persuade
them to adopt resale price maintenance.
2 Ibid.. p. 523.
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Professor Yataey^ reveals that the great majority of manu
facturers In the United Klngdoc* during the last decade of the
nineteenth century were reluctant to adopt resale price main
tenance.

They did not appear to believe that uniform retail

prices for a brand would be of any advantage to them.

Price

maintenance, at best, was regarded as an unfortunate restric
tion sometimes necessary in order to placate influential
sections of the retail trade.
Demands for maintained prices forced a difficult decision
upon the manufacturer.

Since not all retailers were in favour

of price maintenance the manufacturer was faced with an assess
ment of the relative strength of the two broad groups of sup
portera and opponents.

In addition he had to judge the extent

of the damage which each group was likely to inflict upon him
if dissatisfied with his decision.
If frustrated by its introduction, the opponents of re
sale price maintenance would have a strong Incentive to In
crease the sales of substitute brands.

The larger firms could

be moved to undertake production of competitive private brands
and would be able to advertise extensively.

Conversely sup

porters of price maintenance could indicate their dissatisfac
tion with non-protected goods by endeavouring to substitute
other brands and by being uncooperative with manufacturers in
3

Ibid., p. 540,
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their sales and promotion efforts and by keeping their lines
poorly displayed or hidden from view.

Associations of suppor

ting retailers could sponsor the production of brands to be
distributed solely by members, The London and District Tobac
conists Association introduced a selection of its own branded
pocket tobaccos in 1892, and the Birmingham Association mar
keted Its own brands in 1895*^
The retail trade associations used various arguments in
their attempts to persuade manufacturers to adopt resale price
maintenance.

They consisted of a mixture of offers of friend

ship and support at one extreme through to threats of absolute
boycott at the other.

The amount of progress in overcoming

the objections of the manufacturers depended to a great ex
tent upon the strength of the retail organization.

Tlie strong

est and most effective resistance came from producers of well
established brands.

The strongest and moat persistent pres

sure from the retail trade originated with druggists.
The efforts to establish resale price maintenance in
modern retailing originated in the period covering the last
two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of
the twentieth century.

The movement was a result of the efforts

of the independent small retailer to protect his profits from
4 Ibid.. p. 533.
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the danger which aggressive firms and their successful price
policies presented.

The movement originated with the retail

trade and the majority of manufacturers who adopted the prac
tice did 30 reluctantly in the beginning.
Prom this period resale price maintenance met with dif
ferent attitudes on the part of the governments in the United
Kingdom, the United States and Canada as revealed in part by
the existence of or the lack of relevant legislation.
United Kingdom
It is only during the last two decades that the United
Kingdom has enacted legislation aimed at the control of com
bines and restrictive practices.

Prior to the Monopolies and

Restrictive Practices Act of 1948 the United Kingdom had con
ducted public enquiries into the problems of resale price
maintenance on several occasions,
A sub committee of the Standing-Committee on Trusts con
ducted the first enquiry in 1920.

The majority of the commit

tee found that resale price maintenance generally was to the
advantage of the public, provided the maintained prices were
fair and reasonable.

To ensure this overriding provision,

the committee recommended that resale price maintenance, to
gether with other forms of restrictive business practices,
should be subject to supervision by a tribunal which could
investigate specific complaints of excessive charges and
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would be empowered to take or recommend such action as neces
sary to correct the situation.
In 1930, another public inquiry, which also covered
other restrictive business practices than resale price main
tenance, was carried out by the Committee on Restraint of
Trade,

Although the committee viewed price maintenance as

not free from disadvantage to the public, it was not satisfied
that the public interest would be better served through a
change in the existing law.
The Lloyd Jacob Committee was appointed in 1947to investi
gate the practice of resale price maintenance.

In its report

rendered in 1949a the committee recommended no prohibition of
individual resale price maintenance.

But it also concluded

that:
It appears to us to be contrary to the public
interest for a manufacturer to use his power to cut
off supplies in such a way as to obstruct the
growth of particular methods of trading, to impede
the distribution by another manufacturer of com
petitive goods or to deprive the public of the
benefits of low cost systems of distribution,^
The recommendation for not banning the practice was based
on the premise that it protected manufacturers of branded
goods from the harmful effects of so-called "loss-leader"
competition among resellers.

The committee further recommended

5 Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance,
(Lloyd jiacob Committee) (London, 1949) p. 23.
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that the appropriate Government Departments discuss with the
principal national organizations in trade and industry the .
most satisfactory means of removing the undesirable results
of individual resale price maintenance.

In addition it was

recommended that collective resale price maintenance be made
Illegal.
As a result of the failure to resolve the undesirable
effects of the practice, the Government issued a White paper
in June 1951 announcing its intention of introducing legisla
tion to make individual as well as collective resale price
maintenance illegal.

The legislation had not been introduced

when a new government took office in November, 1951.
In December 1952, this government asked the Monopolies
and Restrictive Practices Commission to conduct an inquiry
into certain widely prevalent restrictive practices.

The

committee report was presented in 1955 and as a result the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 was passed.
The collective enforcement of resale prices was made
Illegal but manufacturers were now able to enforce individual
resale contracts not only in the case of dealers who had signed
a contract but also in the case of a person who acquires the
goods with a notice of the resale price conditions.
Between I960 and 1964 The Monopolies Commission conclu
ded in two out of three reports on resale price maintenance
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In particular Industries that the practice was against the
public interest and should be terminated.
In July of 1964, the Government passed the Resale Prices
Act making resale price maintenance illegal effective April
30J 1965.

Suppliers of goods were allowed to apply for ex

emption from the statutory prohibition of resale price main
tenance from August 15, 1964 to November 15, 1964.

Until a

decision is rendered by the Restrictive Trade Practices Court
the suppliers in question can continue with resale price main
tenance,

Suppliers applying after November 15, 1964 will

have to await a favourable decision before commencing price
maintenance.
The Act specifies that the Court may exempt a class of
goods if it appears to the Court that in default of a system
of maintained minimum resale prices applicable to those goods

(a)

the quality of the goods available for sale,
or the varieties of the goods so available
would be substantially reduced to the detri
ment of the public as consumers or users of
those goods; or

(b)

the number of establishments in which the
goods are sold by retail would be substan
tially reduced to the detriment of the
public as such consumers or users; or

(c)

the prices at which the goods are sold by
retail would in general and in the long run
be increased to the detriment of the public
as such consumers or users; or
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(d)

the goods would be sold by retail under con
ditions likely to cause danger to health in
consequence of their misuse by the public as
such consumers or users; or

(e)

any necessary services actually provided in
connection with or after the sale of the goods
by retail would cease to be so provided or
would be substantially reduced to the detri
ment of the public as such consumers or users,

and in any such case that the resulting detriment to the public
as consumers or users of the goods in question would outweigh
any detriment to them as such consumers or users (whether by
the restriction of competition or otherwise) resulting from
the maintenance of minimum resale prices in respect of the
goods.^
A substantial number of requests were submitted for ex
emption from prohibition of resale price maintenance by the
time of the deadline on November 15, 1964.

More recently^

there are indications that a growing proportion of the appli
cations are being withdrawn because of competitive conditions
or lack of legal basis for the request.

6 The Resale Prices Act, 1964, Bee. 5(2) as quoted by
B. S, Yatney Resale Price Maintenance and Shopper's Choice,
(London, 1964) p. 53.
7 See Economist. July 3? 1965, p. 5B.
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United States
The period prior to the 1930»s was characterized by the
uncertainity of the legal position of resale price maintenance.
Under the Sherman Act of I89O, the Courts had held individual
as well as collective price maintenance enforced by agreement
or contract as illegal in interstate commerce.& But the courts
upheld the right of manufacturers to refuse to sell to dealers
who had cut prices substantially,^
Manufacturers interested in establishing resale price
control could attain it either by refusing to sell to dealers
who cut prices or by shipping goods to dealers on consignment,
retaining title until the goods were sold.

The only other

alternative was direct price control through sales agencies
owned by the manufacturer,
Manufacturers found that refusal to sell enabled them to
exercise a considerable degree of control over the resale
price of their distributors (wholesalers).

But in the case

of the retail trade the number of retailers made it difficult
for most manufacturers to deal directly with them.
Experience with resale price control had shown that
8
See E. R. A, Seligraan and R. A. Love, Price Cutting
and Price Maintenance. (New York, 1932) p. 54 for a discussion
of the Hartman and Miles cases,
9
Ibid., pp. 65-8.
Colgate cases.

Cream of Wheat, Goodyear and
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identical retail prices could be secured by means of resale
price contracta.

As a consequence, manufacturers of branded

merchandise and trade association leaders in the retail field
- particularly the drug trade • turned their efforts toward
securing a legalization of resale price maintenance.

The

economic position of wholesalers being closely related to
the profit return of retailers, they also joined in advocating
resale price legislation.
The growth of chain and cut-rate stores offering limited
services and lower prices coupled with the depression In 1930
gave greater Impetus to the efforts of independent retailers
and wholesalers to obtain the legalizing of resale price main
tenance.
The retail and wholesale trade associations in California
were the most aggressive in their demands.

As a result, in

1931 California became the first state to legalize the use of
resale price contracts in intrastate commerce.

To be eligible

the commodity concerned was required to bear the trade-mark,
brand or name of the producer or owner and to be in fair and
open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced by others.

The agreed upon prices were to prevail

at all times except for closing out sales, the sale of damaged
and deteriorated goods, and the sale of goods by order of a
court.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

An amendment to the California statute in 1933 added the
highly significant provision that a single agreement to fix
the resale price of a trade marked product is applicable to
all other sellers even though they do not sign a price main
tenance contract.

This amendment which came to be known as

the ”non-signers* clause" made it possible for a manufacturer
to make a resale price agreement with a single wholesaler or
retailer and thereupon require all other wholesalers or re
tailers in the state to charge the same resale price for the
product.

Any distributor having notice of the contractual

arrangement and not conforming to the prices became at once
subject to civil action on the charge of unfair competition.
This clause made the resale price control laws extremely ef
fective in maintaining prices within the state.
In view of this, the California statute and amendment
were rapidly adopted by a considerable number of other states
at the request of organized trade groups.
As the laws applied only to intrastate commerce price
maintenance still remained illegal in interstate commerce
under the Sherman Act,
In response to the increasing demands of state and local
trade associations. Congress in 1937 enacted the MillerTydings Act, amending the Sherman Act to exempt resale price
agreements in interstate commerce when commodities are shipped
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Into states for resale where such contracts are legal.

Manu

facturers were now able to enforce price maintenance contracts
both on an interstate and an Intrastate basis in those states
which had enacted legislation.
In 1951 the effectiveness of resale price contracts was
substantially restricted by the Supreme Court in the schwegmann Bros. vs. Calvert Distillers Corp. decision.

The Court

ruled that the Miller-Tydings law does not give immunity to
non-signer arrangements.

Only voluntary, signed resale price

contracts, it held, are exempted from the Sherman Act,
The Schwegtnann decision invalidated all resale price
systems in interstate commerce which were based on the use
of non-signer clauses.

As a result in some areas, especially

10
New York
retail price competition became very intense.
The result was a campaign by retail trade associations
to have the Federal legislation altered.

In July 1952, Con

gress passed the McGuire Act which made pannissable the use
of the non-signer clause within a given state, in accordance
with the legislation of the state, by manufacturers selling
in interstate commerce.
But the rise of the large Discount houses during the
early 1950®s created new and costly problems for manufacturers
10 See S, Raymond Corey "Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal". Harvard Business Review. XXX 5, pp. 47-62,
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enforcing resale price maintenance.

The Discount houses

formed their OKtn association to fight against wholesalers and
manufacturers who refused to sell to discount houses, protes
ting that such action was In restraint of trade.
The non-signer clause was ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Courts of thirteen "Pair Trade” states and In two
other states the Supreme Courts held the entire "Fair Trade"
act to be invalid.
The cost of policing price maintenance agreements
became heavier as violations became more frequent.

Manufac

turers began to abandon their fair trade policy, particularly
in the electric appliance Industry
In September 1955* the Westlnghouse Electric Corporation,
after six years of setting fà%r trade prices on its products,
abandoned resale price maintenance.

The General Electric

Company, who had signed approximately 30,000 fair trade agree
ments with retailers and had policed these agreements aggres
sively finally abandoned resale price maintenance In February

1956. The expenditure of approximately one million dollars a
year for the previous two years reveals the company's favour
able attitude toward fair trade but at the same time the

11 See Stewart Munro Lee "Problems of Resale Price Main
tenance", Journal of Marketing. XX31I (January, 1959) pp. 274280 for a more detailed account.
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expenditure indicates how costly such a policy had become.
General Electric was followed one day later by the Sun
beam Corporation who felt they were forced to make the move
in order to keep their dealers competitive in the electrical
appliance market.
A contributing factor to General Electric's decision was
a setback received in 1957 when the courts ruled that mail
order sales from the District of Columbia, where there is no
fair trade law, to New York at prices below those fixed under
"Pair Trade" agreements in New York did not violate the Hew
York fair trade statute.
The efforts of the electrical appliance Industry to keep
resale price maintenance reveals the change in attitude of
manufacturers from the early history of the practice.

Manu

facturers appear to have become more aggressive than retailers
in their efforts to retain price maintenance.
The strong growth of discount department stores coupled
with the rising inclination of aggressive retailers to violate
resale price agreements and risk or fight legal action, no
doubt contributed to the decision of manufacturers to abandon
resale price maintenance In the 1950’s.

It would appear that

resale price maintenance plays an insignificant role in
American marketing policies to-day.
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Canada
Except for the last two decades there appears to be
limited reference to resale pries maintenance in Canadian
journals.

This may be a result of uncertainity about the

legal position of the practice prior to 1951.
Resale price maintenance was concerned in a number of
investigations under the Combines Investigation Act, but usu
ally in conjunction with other restrictive practices.
It was the only issue in one inquiry involving the Pro
prietary Articles Trade Association, an offshoot of a druggists'
trade organization of the same name in Great Britain.

In two

reports published in 1926 and 1927 the conclusion was expres
sed that the public interest was detrimentally affected.

The

Proprietary Articles Trade Association was dissolved shortly
after the final report was published,
A similar conclusion was reached in four other investi
gations under the Combines Investigation Act, tobacco 1938,
dental supplies 1947* optical goods 1948, and bread in western
Canada 1948,
An indication that resale price maintenance was becoming
fairly widespread following World War II appears in the Report
of the Royal Commission on Prices rendered in 1949 which states :
12 See Report of Royal Commission on Prices II (Ottawa^,
1949), p, 258.
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Throughout our inquiry we have been impressed
by the degree to which individual manufacturers fix
the resale prices of their products and so narrow
the area in which price competition amongst whole
salers and retailers is operative. In view of the
extension of this practice, we recommend that the
Combines Investigation Commission give careful
study to this problem with a view to devising
measures to deal with It,^3
The same report reveals that Canadian consumers had be
come perturbed over the practice,

Ihe Canadian Association

of Consumers and the National Council of Women presented a
joint brief to the Royal CooMis&ion on Prices expressing con
cern over the growth of resale price maintenance,
The HacQuarrle Committee was appointed in June 1950 to
study Combines Legislation,

As a result of the recommendation

of the Royal Commission on

Prices, resale pricemaintenance

was

included as part of the study.
The Committee found it difficulti
to measure precisely the extent of resale price
maintenance, The Committee, however, is satisfied
that the practice of fixing resale prices is wide
spread, that it covers whole classes of goods, and
that, if not quite as
comprehensive as theUnited
Kingdom, it la yat of
significant and growing pro
portions,^*
In its interim report on resale price maintenance

13 Report of the Royal Commission on Prices I (Ottm*a,
1949) p. 41.
14 Resale Price Maintenance. An Interim Report of the
Committee to Study"Combinas Legislation (Ottawa, 1951) p® 7
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published In October, 1951, the Committee recommended "that
It should be made an offence for a manufacturer or other sup
plier:
1. To recommend or prescribe minimum resale prices
for his products:
2, TO refuse to sell, to withdraw a franchise or
to take any, other form of action as a means
of enforcing minimum resale prices.15
As a result Canada became the first country to ban resale
price maintenance unconditionally when legislation was enacted
in December 1951.

The Director of Investigation and Research

was allocated the duty of Investigating restrictive practices
forbidden by the Act.

% e Restrictive Trade Practices Com

mission became responsible for examining evidence submitted
to it by the Director,
An extensive public inquiry into loss-leader selling and
the effects of abolishing resale price maintenance resulted
in two reports^^ published in 1954 and 1955 In which it was
concluded that no new legislation was warranted for suppression
or control of loss-leader selling.
Section 34 of the Combines Investigation Act which deals
15 Resale Price Maintenance. An Interim Report, p, 21,
16 (a) Loss-Leader Selling. Material Collected by the
Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade
Practices Conmiisslon, Ottawa, 1954,
(b) Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling,
ibid., 1955.
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with resale price maintenance was amended in I960,

Under the

amendment a manufacturer can now refuse to sell to anyone who
is using his product as a loss-leader, that is, not for the
purpose of making a profit but for advertising or attracting
customers to his store in the hope of selling them other art
icles.

The manufacturer may also refuse to sell to anyone

engaged in misleading advertising of his product or anyone
falling to provide a level of servicing that purchasers might
reasonably expect.
On examination this amendment might lead manufacturers
to attempt to enforce some type of minirapn price based on the
interpretation of the word profit,
Recent Developments in European Legislation^^
Since the action of Canada to ban resale price mainten
ance, the governments of several European countries have taken
measures to abolish or limit the use of resale price mainten
ance.
In 1953 Sweden enacted legislation making resale price
maintenance subject to criminal p.'enalties where permission is
17 See Report Concerning the Piatrlbutlon and Sale of
Electric Appliances, Electric Shavers and Accessory Products,
(sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited) Ottawa, 1962,
18 The following summary is drawn almost exclusively from
O.E.C.D. Restrictive Business Practices, Comparative Summary
of Legislation in Europe and North America (Paris, 1964),
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not granted by the Freedom of Commerce Board,

In spite of

wide legislative grounds for granting permission only three
exemptions were granted between 1953 and 1962 and only recently
one of these was withdrawn.
France adopted a similar attitude toward resale price
maintenance in the same year.

Prohibition of the practice

Is the rule and exemptions are the exception and are "very
rarely granted".
Denmark enacted legislation in 1955 which included a
general prohibition of resale price maintenance unless special
permission is granted by the cartel authority.

Between 1955

and 1963 exemptions were granted to ten products.
Ireland has indicated a growing disapproval of the prac
tice,

Although no legislation has been enacted to prohibit

resale price maintenance generally* six rulings were made pro
hibiting the practice in various trades between 1955 and 1962,
Germany joined the increasing list of countries legislat
ing against resale price maintenance in 1957.

The approach

adopted has been more lenient than other countries with exemp
tions being rather numerous.
Norway by way of Royal Decree also became a member of the
group of countries prohibiting resale price maintenance in
1957. Exceptions are allowed but have seldom been granted.
19

Ibid.. p. 19
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only throe exemptions resulting between 1957 and 1961.
The increase in legislation directed at abolishing or
limiting the practice of resale price maintenance appears to
Indicate an increasing doubt of the validity of arguments
favouring acceptance of resale price maintenance.

The next

chapter Is devoted to a consideration of the arguments more
frequently encountered.
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CHAPTER III

FREQUENT ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRACTICE
In examining the most prevalent arguments in support:of
resale price maintenance the following point should be kept in
mind;
When discussing the motives which induce dis
tributors and manufacturers to support resale price
maintenance, one has to take into consideration a
source of error that àâ always present in cases
where human interest are involved; the parties con
cerned tend to omit or under-emphasiae the more
selfish motives behind their actions and to make
much of their concern for the public welfare. To
obtain a true picture of the situation, it is,
therefore, necessary to make a critical appraisal
of the motives publicly stated and also to consider
whether there may not be other motives as well.l
A frequent argument in favour of resale price maintenance
contends that it helps to keep the small independent retailer
in business, thus ensuring an adequate number of outlets and
preventing concentration of economic power,

Ohls result would

be achieved because resale price maintenance requires all dis
tributors to sell at a uniform price providing an adequate
margin of profit for all.
Without resale price maintenance large department and
chain stores operating at

a lower unit cost are in a position

to charge a lower price than the small retailer.

% e large

1 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris,
1958) p. 36.
28
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retailers are also in a favourable position to use the "lossleader" device in order to attract oiore business and gradually
eliminate the small retailers.

In addition the large stores

have contï*oî over their private brands and without resale price
maintenance price cutting would occur only on products also
handled by dealers whose volume of trade is already too small
to enable them to carry their own brands*

As a result of

these advantages the larger outlets would Increase their share
of the market forcing the small retailer out of business*
The first presumption in the argument is that all small
retailers should be protected from the price competition of
large retailers, particularly the department and chain stores,
or the small retailer will disappear,
There Is no doubt that without the protection of resale
price maintenance the chances of survival of the inefficient
and marginal operators among the small retailers are greatly
reduced,
Data in Table 1 indicate: a tendency to larger retail
outlets but at the same time would appear to suggest that the
small retailer has continued to survive despite the banning of
resale price, maintenance in Canada,
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Table 1
gercent; Change In the Number of Selected Types of
of Retail Stores In Ontario 1951 to 1961*

Total Ontario
Tobacco stores and stands
Books and stationery stores
Hardware stores
Household appliance stores
Jewellery stores
Drug stores
Department stores
Furniture. T.V.. radio and apollanoes
*Source:

-

15.7
-7.5
60.0
13.7
-8.7
10.8
ÿ.o
58.6

Census of Canada, 1961.

During a similar period in the United Kingdcmi the same
tendency to larger retail outlets was present even though re
sale price maintenance was in effect.

During this period

from 1950 to 1961 the number of small retailers declined by
6,000

indicating that resale price maintenance does not nec

essarily protect the Inefficient small retailer.
In Canada the greatest price conq>etition in some instances
has come not from the large department stores and chains but
from the growing independent retailer who only a few years
previous was a small retailer himself «3

effect has been

changes in retailing methods with resulting benefits for

2 See "RFM - The Castle %mble@". Economist (March 13*
1965) pp. 1157-58.
3 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling.
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa* 1955) pp. 4952.
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consumers.
The second portion of the same argument assumes that the
concentration of economic power in the retail field is neces
sarily against the interests of the consumer.
Resale price maintenance has tended to appear in indus
tries in which there are relatively few well established manu
facturers with systems of national distribution.

The situa

tion approaches that outlined by J. K. Galbraith^ in which a
market has been pre-empted by a few large sellers, entry of
new firms has become difficult and existing firms have accep
ted a convention against price coi^etition.

Strong sellers,

the manufacturers, in control of prices are opposed by weak
buyers.
"In the typical m o d e m market of few sellers the active
restraint is provided not by cong>etitors but from the other
side of the market by strong buyers".5

The development of

economic power by retailers will serve the interest of the
consumer as the large retailers use their bargaining power to
exert pressure on the margins of manufacturers.

"Retailers

are required by their situation to develop countervailing
power on the consumer's behalf.

4 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston,
1956) p. 113.
5 Ibid.. p. 112.
6 Ibid.. p. 117,
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Without resale price maintenance, price competition
among distributors and the resulting reduction of gross profit
margins will tend to give rise to increasing demands from all
distributors that manufacturers reduce their prices to them.
As price competition is likely to favour the larger and more
active retailers, their bargaining strength as opposed to the
manufacturer Is increased making the possibility of obtaining
a price concession from manufacturers more likely.
Two frequent arguments that are closely related are that
resale price maintenance (l) prevents vertical integration
and (2) protects the specialized retailer.

By accomplishing

the protection of the specialized retailer the reason for the
need of vertical integration is also eliminated.

The conaaon

basis for both arguments is the need for specialized selling
and aftersale service for so-called technical goods - electric
appliances, radios, television.
The argument states th&t without resale price maintenance
competition will drive prices to such a level that retailers
will not want to handle the product or will not provide the
aftersale service; which is required.

Consequently manufactur

ers may decide to establish their own retail outlets to ensure
proper aftersale service.
The protection of the specialized dealer is considered
necessary to ensure an efficient system of distribution in the
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The consumer will receive no bargain

if he should purchase an electrical appliance at a low price
if it falls and he finds it impossible to obtain parts or
service.
Canadian experience has disproved these arguments.^

In

the electrical ^pliance industry Inppartlcular, servicing
requirements have been much less than indicated.

S«ae retail

ers have hired special service con^anles to carry out their
servicing.

In some of the larger centres manufacturers have

established their own service centres.

Pre selling by manu

facturers and greater conswner knowledge have greatly decreased
the need for specialized knowledge in selling.
Supporters have also argued that resale price maintenance
prevents the use of monopoly power at the retail level and the
resulting excessive prices.

The basis of the reasoning is

that without resale price maintenance prices of an individual
manufacturer's product would vary in different localities
dependent upon whether there was more than one dealer in its
products.

In small localities served by only one dealer,

prices would tend to increase out of line with large coomanities where there are a number of dealers.
According to this argument* competitive conditions are

7 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling.
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa* 1955) pp. 112-

123.
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Each retail

er has a certain amount of Influence over a section of his
clientele even if faced with a large number of competitors.
This monopolistic aspect increases as the number of ccHnpetitors decreases.

One seller in a «nail community may have con

siderable monopoly power.

With resale price maintenance how

ever, monopoly power does not present any threat since main
tained prices are maxieaun as well as minimum.8
This argianent overlooks one of the main characteristics
of retailing, the ease of entry.

If a retailer is the only

dealer in a community and charges excessive prices, the
incentive exists to set up a competitive outlet, undersell ttie
existing retailer and still obtain an adequate profit.

In

addition, the location of the eomnunity in relation to sur
rounding communities will be a limiting factorw

Excessive

prices may drive patronage to a neighboring eonmiunlty.
Another argument in the same vein is that resale price
maintenance results in a more stable price structure and pre
vents excessive prices in both directions.

The emphasis is

on the retarding effect on the upward pressure of prices.

In

times of scarcity resale price maintenance is argued to pre
vent the charging of excessive prices with the resulting

8 Canadian legislation countered this argument by allow
ing suppliers to set a "maximum" resale price.
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exorbitant profits.
Prices under a resale price system will be slower to move
up or down for two reasons.

First, the structure of the sys

tem Itself will require infrequent changes.

Frequent changes

could result in loss of dealer and consumer confidence and
would also make It difficult to coordinate advertising policies
Secondly, manufacturers margins are likely to be more than
adequate and consequently less sensitive to coat increases.
In times of scarcity It is doubtful if the manufacturer
will be able to maintain the price if pressure is strong.

The

retailer has other alternatives to increasing prices openly to
obtain an increased return from the product.

Under the coun

ter transactions are difficult to detect and would require a
great deal of policing on the part of the manufacturer.
This argument also assumes that price stability is desir
able.

Flexible prices are necessary to adjust to changing

conditions of supply and demand.

In times of shortage of

supply price adjustment is the natural means of determining
who will receive the available supply unless government inter
vention is warranted.

Conversely when demand is low price

cuts are desired in an effort to stimulate demand and maintain
production and employment.
The most frequent argument advanced by the manufacturer
is his need for protection by resale price maintenance from
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the use of his product as a "loss-leader". Such use is
alleged to damage the manufacturer's interests in several ways,
It results in the loss of public confidence in the product.
Because of the unprofitable price it may influence retailers
to push substitute goods on which they can make an adequate
profit,

The "loss-leader" practice may lead to the loss of

retail outlets to the manufacturer as retailers find it is
not profitable to handle his product and discontinue stocking
it.
The "loss-leader" is the most controversial aspect of the
arguments concerning retail price maintenance.

It is related

to practically every argument submitted by retailer» whole
saler and manufacturer who support resale price maintenance.
Consequently it has been given separate attention in the next
chapter.
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Vr

THE LOSS-LEADER QUESTION
After first outlinig the main arguments advanced to sup
port the need of resale price maintenance to prevent "lossleaders" this chapter will discuss the Interpretation and def
inition of the concept of a "loss-leader".

This will be fol

lowed by a rebuttal to the arguments and a summary of attempts
or recommendations short of resale price maintenance which
have been made with the view of controlling loss-leaders.
"Loss-leaders" it is maintained are products which are
sold at a loss with the purpose of drawing customers to the
retail outlet who will not only buy the loss-leader but also
other articles carrying normal or high profits.

The objective

is to obtain profits from the sale of other conanodities to new
customers which will more than offset the loss resulting from
the leader.
In some instances it has been said that this practice is
actually unfair to the customer.

The reasoning is that the

prices of other goods must necessarily be higher than in other
retail outlets in order to cover the loss of the leader.
It is further argued that unless their resale prices are
maintained established brands in general demand will always be
used as loss-leaders by some retailers.

Resulting price

37
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competition will force down the prices of the brand concerned
throughout the market area to the same low level.

Ultimately

retail margins will be reduced to the point where dealers will
no longer be interested in selling these brands.

Manufacturers'

sales will suffer both from the loss of retail outlets and the
loss of customer confidence and goodwill,

With all retailers

prices at the sane low level, those retailers who made the
original price cut will have no further competitive advantage
and will turn to new brands as loss-leaders.
Consequently there is a continual tendency to disturb the
market of well-known brands.

The manufacturers of these brands

require resale price maintenance to protect their interests,
îhe market fluctuations resulting from the use of branded pro
ducts as loss-leaders will make steady production and sale of
the goods impossible.

In order to maximize economies in the

production of branded goods resale price maintenance is neces
sary and therefore in the interest of consumers.
Ihe basis of the loss-leader reasoning is open to criti
cism from two points of view.

First, the very concept of a

loss-leader has never attained an acceptable exact definition.
Second, the required assumptions for price competition to re
sult in the reasoned disruption of turnover and production are
very precise with the consequence they are rarely found in
practice.
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The Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in
its inquiry into loss-leader selling found:
that a major difficulty in approaching the examina
tion of practices alleged to Involve loss-leader
selling, is to obtain a clear description of the
f o m s of selling which would unmistakably constitute
such a practice, and not merely active price conpetition. Indeed a satisfactory definition is so
elusive that a number of those appearing before the
Commission stated that they did not know how lossleader selling should be defined, or that there was
no point in trying to define it, or that it cannot
be defined.!
% e term "loss-leader" suggests the distinctive feature
of an item sold at a price involving a financial loss.

The

problem arises in selecting a yardstick to separate loss-leader
competition from ordinary price competition, that is to deter
mine when prices involve a loss and when they do not.
In their inquiry the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis
sion found that definitions submitted fell roughly into two
categories "depending on whether the emphasis in the definition
was in terms of the purpose of the price cut or whether it was
in terms of the extent of the price cut"
In the definition of loss-leader selling which gave empha
sis to the extent of the price cut, the price below which it
was argued an article could not be sold without being considered

1 Report on An Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. Restric
tive Trade Practices Commission. (Ottawa, 1955) p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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a loss-leader, ranged through the entire scope from the manu
facturer's suggested retail price to the lower of invoice or
replacement cost.
As a result it becomes difficult to determine just what
is really meant by "loss-leader" cc^etition.

The objective

of all forms of competition Is to obtain new customers, or
keep old ones, with the view of raising or stabilising sales
and increasing net profits.
According to economic theory, a specific price results
in a loss to a retailer if be would be better off by not sell
ing the product at all than by doing so at the price consid
ered,

Using this analysis a loss is suffered only if the pur

pose of the loss-leader is not realized,

That purpose is to

Increase the total net profit of the retailer, the loss of
the leader being more than offset by the profit on the increa
sed turnover of other goods.

Because of the close connection

which sometimes exists between the sale of various merchandise
in a store the purpose may be accomplished in spite of the
fact that the leader is sold below its invoice cost to the
retailer.
By the same reasoning it is apparent that retailers who
use loss-leaders will not necessarily charge higher prices
for other goods than their con^etitors.^

It is possible with

3 Ibid., pp. 95-101.
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their prices of other goods equal to or lower than their com
petitor's prices that the net profit on the increased sale of
those goods may exceed the loss on the leader.

It is Impor

tant to note in this respect that the operating costs of a
retail outlet in the very short run may be considered in the
most part fixed or overhead costs.

Consequently the increase

in costs resulting fran a larger turnover will not greatly exi-i
ceed the invoice price of the additional goods sold.
It is apparent that the usual criterion of economic theory
to distinguish profitable from unprofitable pricing would not
be applicable in separating loss-leader competition from ordi
nary price coR^etition.

Using principles of economic theory,

loss-leader competition would include only those cases where
the Objective of using loss-leaders was not achieved, the pro
fit on the increased turnover of other goods failed to cover
the loss on the leader.

Such z*esults being viewed as tactical

errors resulting in iquick correction it cannot be against such
incidents that the major claim to protection from loss-leader
competition is raised.
Another definition frequently encountered is that lossleader competition exists when the prices of leaders in iso
lation do not cover the cost Involved in selling those leaders^

4 See Soren Gammelgaard. Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris
1958) p. 49, and Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p. 11.
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difficulty arises in deteiwlnlng the selling costs invol
ved^ as overhead costs are ocmmon to all goods sold.

The

distribution of overhead costs over the various articles of
merchandise has no generally approved application.

Goods sold

in the same store contribute in an unecpial degree to the cov
ering of these costs.

Therefore It would not be feasible to

argue that loss-leader competition exists where goods do not
contribute proportionally to the covering of overhead costs.
This suggests that in deciding which costs are involved
in selling the leader we should disregard overhead costs.

As

practically all operating costs in the very short run are
overhead costs^ this definition then implies in practice that
goods are only loss-leaders when they are sold below their
purchase price.

But this would require further qualification

so as not to include perishable items sold below cost to limit
loss, sales in trades with seasonal pricing where it is con
sidered legitimate practice to sell goods out-of-season at
strongly reduced prices; sales of bankrupt firms and clearance
sales of old stocks.
A further definition would identify loss-leaders as art
icles sold with a smaller margin than other merchandise belon
ging to the same general category in the same store.^

5 See Soren Oammelgaard,
p. 50.

But a g # n

Resale Price Maintenance, ibid.,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a problem arises in arriving at a standard.

43
Some goods are

of a distinctive nature allowing no comparison.

Even where

there is a basis for comparison, brands with a slower rate of
turnover would carry higher margins than quicker-moving brands,
if competition were totally free and were unaffected by restric
tive influences or practices.
This definition is too inclusive, as it is not concerned
with the absolute level of margins, but only with the relative
level.

As a result loss-leader competition would be identified

as )all cases where a brand is sold at a lesser margin than
other brands of the same type of goods, whether a loss is
suffered or a profit is gained.
Professor B, S. Yamey defines a "loss-leader" as "a
’leader* Item which is re-sold below its trade price to the
shopkeeper"
It would appear that the definiticm of a "loss-leader"
in order to be consistent with the literal term would include
goods sold for a purpose other than contributing, in isolation,
directly to the gross profit of the retailer.

This would

Include all goods sold at or below invoice price to the re
tailer.

Merchandise sold at invoice cost certainly will not

contribute directly to the gross profit of the retailer and in

6 B, S, Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance and Shipper’s
Choice. (London, 1964) p. 27,
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most cases would involve scwie loss on the sale In isolation
of the goods concerned due to minimal handling costs for any
merchandise carried.

The definition should exclude goods sold

at or below cost for the purpose of clearing end of season
stock or broken and discontinued lines, or for the:purpose
of raising money to meet urgent cash requirement or disposing
of stock of banlcpupt firms.
It is apparent from the numerous surveys carried out by
different governments that "loss-leader competition is all too
often used to describe pries competition which is coming from
new types or methods of retailing.
It is difficult to see how the use of a "loss-leader" or ft
any type of price competition can be unfair to the consumer
as claimed.

Lower prices are hardly a hardship on the consumer.

There no doubt have been instances where retailers have
used leaders with the Intention of trapping the gullible.

The

major use of the leader has been as a type of advertisement
designed to attract customers to the retailers premises.
If the retailer has made a selective price cut(s) and
left the remaining articles at competitive prices, custonora
are better off by the amount of the saving on the leader item.
Even if the retailer has raised the prices of other mer
chandise, a purchaser of this merchandise is only worse off
if his increased expenditure on these articles in greater than
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the saving on the leader.
But the argument of increased prices on other merchandise
is contradictory in nature.

On one hand we have a consumer

who is sensitive to advertised bargains and yet on the other
Is not conscious of the competitive prices on other goods.
Tills is very inconsistent behaviour when we consider the vol
ume of price advertising plus many other methods of price ccmparison.
The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in a survey^
involving grocery retailing found that in the three geogr^hical areas surveyed the prices of other goods in the "lossleader" stores were on the average four to seven per cent
below the prices of identical goods in comparable shops which
did not use "loss-leaders” , Veiy few items showed any differ
ence in the opposite direction.
In considering manufacturers* claims that their products
will suffer loss of sales because of use as loss-leaders, the
question arises as to wliat conditions would cause a result so
opposed to accepted economic laws of supply and demand,
TO attain the result claimed by manufacturers that price
reductions by aggressive retailers in various locations will
drive prices down to the same level everywhere, the demand for

7 See Report on an Inquiry Into Loss-Leader Selling, Re
strictive Trade Practices Commission, (Ottawa, 1955) pp. 97-

101,
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the product involved must be very senaltive to price differ
ences. In addition, the knowledge of prices must be very
general,
For a manufacturer to suffer unfavourable results from
price competition m o n g retailers it must be the retailer and
not the coimumer who decides which brands are sold.

Only

under this assumption would it be possible for sales to decrease
when prices are reduced.

This is contradictory to the basic

economic reasoning that consumers buy more as prices are re-

duced.G
The argument of the manufacturer that prices of his brand
will be forced down by competition between retailers to a
point where many retailers will no longer be interested in
selling his brand must be based on several assumptions.

First,

the price must be at or below the invoice price to the retailer.
Secondly, the price must be kept at this point for a consider
able period of time, not just for a few days or a week as in
the case In special sales.

Thirdly, the retailer is willing

to risk loss of customers goodwill by not having available a
widely advertised well known product.9

Fourthly, the retailer

8 Assuming levels of income and distribution of income
are held constant,

9

retailer may overcome this by stocking the manu
facturer’s product but not "pushing" its sale.
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has a substitute brand on which the margin is adequate and
which can in moat cases be substituted for the dropped brand
without injuring customer good will to any extent.
In their inquiry into loss-leader selling the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission concluded:
that sales below net purchase cost for the purpose
of increasing the seller’s general sales volume are
made ixif3;>eqath|ply, and when such selling is engaged
in it is generally for periods of short duration.
The offering of goods in such a manner appears to
result fyom active competition among merchants of
comparable standing, and not from market domination
by any one dealer or group of dealers.10
It would then appear the purpose served by selling below
cost is to obtain effective advertising to attract customers
to the store,

% e objective is an Immediate stimulus to con

sumers, a bargain which is available for a limited time.

The

continual use of one item as a loss-leader would tend to ex
haust its attraction and to establish the loss-leader price as
the consistent price in the consumeras mind,

The retailer

using the loss-leader technique must find new bargains to main
tain the effectiveness of his advertising and keep the consumer
interest.
The manufacturer who argues that the retailer will drop
his brand because of retail price competition must make the
assumption that competitive brands will not be exposed to use

10 Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selli^. Restric
tive Trade Practices Commission (6ti:awa,
p. 2 ^
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At the same time he

must discount the effectiveness of his advertising and the
popularity of his product.
If a retailer discontinues carrying a well established
regularly advertised product he immediately supplies a perfect
reason for any of his customers who wish to purchase the prod
uct to patronise hia competitor.
The asaunqxtion that a suitable substitute exists for the
discontinued stock must be based on the presumption that the
substitute has a maintained price and therefore an adequate
margin.

This la Inconsistent since without resale price main

tenance all brands would be exposed to use as "loss-leaders?
and to price competition.
A manufacturer will undoubtedly lose some dealers, the in
efficient through their inability to survive and some who may
eliminate his product from their merchandising policy.

This

does not mean his total sales volume expressed in units of
product will fall.
The efforts of competitive dealers to maintain and in
crease sales and the resulting lower prices will be compelling
factors leading to increased product sales volume for the manu
facturer,
Manufacturers' arguments that sales volume will fall may
be based on dollar sales volume and it cannot be denied that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
dollar sales volume may fall If prices are pushed d m m far
enough but product sales volime may increase nevertheless.
The measures proposed to eliminate "loss-leader" selling
range from resale price maintenance to reliance on legislation
which prevents the use of economic power to eliminate competi
tion.
One of the most common proposals outside of resale price
maintenance Is for legislation to make any distributor liable
to legal action if he should sell or advertise for sale any
products as "loss-leaders".

The action may be civil or crim

inal.
Loss-leader is defined as selling below cost where cost
is defined as the price to the distributor plus a specified
mark-up.

Such proposals normally Include an exemption for

certain types of sales, legitimate clearance sales, sales of
perishable or aeasonad goods and goods sold under court order.
Legislation prohibiting the use of such loss-leaders in
certain product lines was passed during the 1930's In three
western provinces, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia. In
each case the required mark up on total cost to the retailer
was five percent.

Similar legislation enacted in various

states of the United States contain stipulated percentage mark
ups ranging from six to as high as twelve percent.
The proposal of The Retail Merchants Association of Canada
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Inc. to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission recommen
ded a mark up equal to "the distributor's or vendor's cost of
doing business.

In the absence of proof of the cost of doing

business such cost shall be prima facie the lowest operating
cost shown by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics' most recent
report the type of classification of trade involved,
The adoption of any proposal stipulating a minimum re
quired mark up establlshsa lower limit for all retail margins.
In the case of low margin items it may actually operate to
increase prices.
Variations exist within any one establishment with re
spect to margins on different merchandise resulting from dif
ferences in handling costs and rate of turnover.

In addition

costs vary between retailers in the same line of business and
possibly to a greater extent between retailers In different
types of business handling the sane product.

Consequently

such limitations of margins will hamper retailers in their
attempt to market their merchandise most effectively.
American esqperienoe with such legislation in various
states has indicated the limitations of such measures.

12

The

11 Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. Restrie,
tlve Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955), p. 230.

12 See Loss-Leader Selling. Material Collected by Direc
tor of Investigation, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
(Ottawa, 1954), pp. 279-85.
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lack of interest in enforcement stems f r m the reluctance of
retailers to file complaints or bring suits against competit
ors.

Enforcement of such legislation by a government bogy

would entail a tremendous administrative burden in policing
the various prices concerned,
The i960 amendment to the Canadian Legislation has returned
the Initiative to the manufacturer.

% e amendment n^adst

(5) Where, in a prosecution under this section, it
is proved that the person charged refused or coun
selled the refusal to sell or supply an article to
sny other person, no inference unfavourable to the
person charged shall be drawn from such evidence if
he satisfies the court that he and any one upon whose
report he depended had reasonable cause to believe
and did believe
(a) that the other person was msdcing a prac
tice of using articles supplied by the person
charged as loss-leaders, that is to say, not
for the purpose of making a profit thereon
but for purposes of advertising!
(b) that the other person was making a prac
tice of using articles supplied by the person
charged not for the purpose of selling such
articles at a profit but for the purpose
attracting customers to his store in the hope
of selling them other articles;
(c) that the other person was making a prac
tice of engaging in misleading advertising in
respect of articles supplied by the person
charged; or
(d) that the other person made a practice of
not providing the level of servicing that purchasess of such articles m l ^ t reasonably
expect from such other person.13

13 Combines Investigation Act. Revised Statutes of CansK^a
(Ottawa, 19éo)'Part V, Section S'+iS).

See Appendix.
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This amendment now gives the manufacturer a basis for
establishing a mlnlnmm resale price,

Tbis price would consist

of the cost of the product to the retailer plus a stipulated
mark-up which the manufacturer has "reasonable cause to believe"
to be necessary if the product is to be sold at a profit.
In other words it is the manufacturer who now defines the
"loss-leader".

As a means to maintaining his minimum resale

price it «appears the manufacturer can now legally withhold
supplies.
An excellent example of this is revealed in the Report of
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission on an Investigation
into the distribution policies of the Sunbeam Corporation
(Canada) Limited.
Commenting on the passage of the ameWment one of the
company's executives in a letter to the president of the
parent American c<xnpany writes:
In the meantime we are making certain investi
gations with some of the local economists and sta
tisticians to try and obtain as much information as
we can about average profits by most electric appli
ance retailers in an effort to have some basis on
which we can justify our refusal to sell these fel
lows who are loss-leadering. All we have to have
is reason to believe they are doing this and any
accurate statistical information that we have can
be used as a basis.^4

14 Report Concerning the Distribution and Sale of Elec
tric Appliances. Electric Shavers and Accessory Products
(Sunbem Corporation (Canada) Limited ) Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (ott^a, 1962), p. 14.
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Subsequently the company embarked on a marketing progrmn
designed to "establish minimum profitable resale prices for
d

e

a

l

e

r

s

"

.

resulted in an enquiry toy the Director of

Investigation and Research under the Coaâjines Investigation
Act with the evidence and argument toeing presented to the Re
strictive Trades Practices Conmission in June, 1962. At the
time of writing a decision is pending on the Court action which
resulted from the investigation,^^
The time consuming procedure involved in bringing such
actions tù court must operate to the benefit of the manufac
turer's marketing plan.

Supplies have been effectively with

held from retailers concerned for a lengthy period with its
implications to the remaining dehlers.^7
The only effective method which appears open to the re
tailer under this legislation is to submit proof to the dis
tributor or manufacturer tliat his average cost is less than
the minimum mark-up stressed by the manufacturer.

It would

15 Ibid., p. 16.
16 The decision will not be available until after a dec
ision is rendered on the constitutionality of resale price
maintenance in a ease brought by Mr. Cooper Caoqpbell of Toronto
contending that Section 34 (2) (b ) of the Act (see Appendix A)
is ultra virés on the grounds that the section contravenes the
constitution.
17 % e possibility exists under the Act for the retailer
to obtain on injunction preventing the manufacturer from with
holding supplies but it has not been used.
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%)pear that retailers are reluctant to reveal their financial
books to manufacturers and in any case accounting differences
would undoubtedly contribute to disagreements on the statements
submitted.
Even if the retailer were to establish his average costs
as lying below the minimum maiic-up believed by the manufacturer
to be profitable it would appear he would still be required
to mark-up the product the amount of his average cost.

As

mentioned previously mark-ups on various items handled by a
retail outlet can vary considerably depending on handling costs
and rate of turnover.

Consequently the mark-up on low margin

items would be increased under this method.
It appears that any legislation designed to control or
eliminate "loss-leaders" will be open to criticism.

The fact

that the concept of a loss-leader is not precise but has a wide
range of meanings to various people may be an insurmountable
obstacle.

The establishing of a minimum mark-up creates a

barrier which competitive forces are prevented from possibly
passing.
The banning of sales at or below net cost to the distrib
utor would protect the manufacturer from the obvious case
where his product is being used for advertising.

But even this

legislation would require qualification for certain special
sales.

Indications are that sales at or below cost are
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relatively rare and consequently such legislation would be of
little value,
% e use of legislation designed to control measures aimed
at eliminating a oompetitor^9 would appear adequate to deal
with any cases of grave loss-leading.
In Chapter II it was noted that the early organized move
ments to obtain resale price maintenance originated with the
independent small retailers who have continued to support the
practice.

In the next chapter an attempt is made to determine

the possible reasons which motivate the small retailer in his
support and to assess the economic effects of resale price
maintenance on the distribution system.

18 See Report on an Inquiry into Loaa-Leadfer/.Selling,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p, 262,
19 See Appendix A, Section 33A, B Ss C,
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CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OP RESALE PRICE WAIHTSNAMCS
AT THE DISTRIBUTION LEVEL
Although it is the manufacturer who operates a system of
individual resale price maintenance the initiative does not
always come from this source.

Soren Oammelgaard found "that

more often than not it is the retailer and their trade associ
ation who induce the manufacturers to adopt this method of
price fixing"
B, S. Yaraey writing about the origins of resale price
maintenance in the United Klngd<m states*
"With perhaps a few exceptions, the story of
the beginnings of r.p.m. is that of the activities
of organized bodies of shopkeepers, operating on
traditional lines with the provision of more-orless elaborate services at relatively high costs,
seeking to induce manufacturers of branded goods to
protect them against the competition of other re
tailers willing and able to work on lower gross
margins and to sell at lower retail prices, because
of their greater efficiency or their less exten
sive retailing services."^
It was through the aggressive campaigning of the retail
and wholesale trade organizations In California that the first
"Fair Trade" legislation was passed in 1931 in the United State a «

1 Soren Oammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris,
1958), p. 35.
2 B. S, Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance and Shopper's
Choice. (London, 1964), p. 11.
56
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Regardless of what arguments laay be forthccmlng retailers
and wholesalers will favour resale price maintenance over no
price maintenance only if there is some economic benefit to
be obtained.

In order to induce business men to W o p t the

practice, resale price maintenance must result in higher or
safer profits or at least be thougiit to do so.
The primary concern of the retailers who support resale
price maintenance must be protection of profits, the mainten
ance of the "status quo".

Resale price maintenance assists the

established retailer in keeping hla segment of the max^et.
The monopolistic elements which determine the individual
retailers market in the absence of price competition are pri
marily of a spatial and personal nature.

The convenience of

location, shopping habits, treatment in the past, preference
for the retailer, his staff and amenities are all factors which
assist in holding more particularly the patronage of the small
retailer.
The consumer is unlikely to be tempted into changing his
shopping pattern unless some relatively substantial benefit is
to toe obtained.

Resale price maintenance tends to eliminate

the most potent attraction, lower prices.
It may be argued that the consumer could be attracted by
a low price on goods which do not have resale price maintenance.
But this will depend upon the prevalence of resale price
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maintenance.
Where only a few products have maintained prices it may
prove effective but where resale price maintenance is generally
prevalent price outs on non-maintalned articles would have to
be relatively substantial.

In either case the consumer may

end up by buying less expensive articles at the competitive
retail outlet and the price maintained articles from the small
retailer.

Also, the general prevalence of resale price main

tenance may contribute to the consumers' acceptance of the
prices of the maall retailer on non-maintained articles.
Resale price maintenance thus tends to maintain the influ
ence of location a small retailer has over his market.

Encroach*

ment by coi^etltive retailers is hampered because they are
limited in their use of price cos^tltion.
In ældition resale price maint^anoe makes the entry of
new retailers into an established market nx>re difficult.

The

most effective method available to the new retailer to attract
customers to his premises is the offer of lower prices.

The

more widespread the use of resale price maintenance the more
difficult it is to use this method to establish a required
volume of trade,

9he practice thus affords the small non

aggressive retailer some protection against both established
and new con^etitors.
Individual resale price maintenance could be used as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59
round about method of obtaining a horizontal price agreement
among retailers.

Should a group of retailers tacitly agree

among themselves that they wish to maintain the price of an
article this objective can be attained by persuading the
manufacturer to loqxlement a program of resale price mainten
ance.

It is actually more effective than a horizontal agree

ment as the manufacturer will have i^ans of disciplining those
who do not adhere to the price.
The elimination of price competition by the general use
of price maintenance affects retailing methods and techniques
and most important, retailing costs.

Competition is not ended

even if all merchandise handled is price maintained.

Resale

price maintenance eliminates the most effective tool of com
petition and drives con^etitive energies into other channels.
The resulting diversion of coo^etition aitay from competitive
price re(|u4tion tends to Increase the amount of resources
devoted to the provision of retail services.
Price maintenance does not eliminate the possi
bility of modifications in the structure of retail
trades, but generally works in favour of established
firms by retarding change and by eliminating price
competition, the most effective instrument of change.3
With price competition abolished or limited in effect,
non-price competition increases.

Since a retailer cannot

3 B. S, Yamey, % e EoonCTnios of Resale Price Maintenance
(London, 1954), p. 87,
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increase his sales by striving to reduce costs and prices,
competitive effort tends to result in cost Increases through
larger e x p ^ i t u r e s on advertising, attractive store furnish
ings and displays, easy credit, free delivery services in
attempts to stimulate buying.

Resale price maintenance diverts

effort from cost-decreasing measures while promoting costincreasing systems of selling.

% e consumer is denied the

benefits of lower costs and the choice of variations in ser
vice.
It is easy for the consumer to decide where to buy when
identical articles are sold at a lower price in one store than
in another particularly as the lower price outlet will be sure
to publicize its advantage.

Customers can also calculate the

amount of saving achieved by switching to a new source.
But with price maintenance it become much more difficult
in decldii% on the best buy*

It beccmies difficult to deter

mine which retailer offers the greatest advantage in services
such as credit, free deliveries, after sale semice to mention
a few.

Retailers will undoubtedly advertise the advantages of

their services but the similarity of claims end the vagueness
of differences will hacker customers* decisions.

Personal

visits to enable close examination may supply more information
but the customer will still not be able to gauge in terms of
money which offers the greatest value*
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Resale price maintenance prevents the retailer from
selecting his own individual ccKBhination of price,sservice
and sales promotion*

As a result the conswaers liberty of

choice between patronising a store with low prices and a mini
mum amount of service and sales effort or patronising another
outlet with higher prices and more impressive service is re
moved or limited,
% a t seme of the additional service resultix^ from resale
price maintenance is of value to the oonsimer Is indisputable.
But the relevant point is that some consumers would prefer
lower prices over better or increased service.4

Resale price

maintenance forces them to pay for service they would rather

4 "Many shoppers are helped by suitably trained and expe
rienced sales staff and by being able to chose from a wide
range of goods. Helpful amS ctmqpetent staff and wide and
varied stocks are costly. These costs can be largely avoided
by retailers who let the goods sell themselves and vdxo limit
their stocks to a narrow range of items which are best sellers.
It would be ideal if the two types of shop could flourish sideby-slde, the proportions to be settled by the preferences of
shoppers. It is conceivable, however, that the two types of
shop could not co-exist so long as they are able to charge
different prices f w the Sftae goods. It is arguable that some
shoppers may make use of the excellent services and selections
in a shop of the first type, and decide what they want to buy.
They may then go to a shop of the second type and buy the items
they want.... Thus they eanbuy at the lower prices, after
availing themselves (without cost to themselves) of the expen
sive services of the first shop. It follows that shops of the
first type would tend to go out of b u s i n e s s . T h e consumers
would be worse off;..." B. S. Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance
and Shopper's Choice (London, 1964) p. 20, Althou^ Yamey pre
sents the soundest counter-argument to this point we could dis
cover, he is not convinced of its validity.
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îtoreover as the consumers who would most prefer

lower prices to additional service are to be found principally
in the lower-ineome groups, resale price maintenance may be
said to discriminate more particularly against this groi^.
The sensational suooess of the cash amd carry discount
store in both the United States and Canada has illustrated
that a large groip of consumers from all classes are prepared
to forego extensive retail services or to break established
habits of ahos^ing under the stimulus of price reductions*
B, S« Y m e y is asseaaing the effect of resale price main
tenance in t^e United Kingdom writes:
The denial to cwsumera of the effective choice
between more elaborate and less elaborate services
has IrAlbited the development of retailing methods
which provide goods cheaply but with austere service...^
• In the short run resale price maintenance will prevent
the competitive retailer from reaching his most efficient level
of operation*

In the long run resale price maintenance will

hinder the developnent of econmles of scale in retailing*^
The short %%n objective can be obtained by increasing
the turnover of stock to its most efficient point.

The long

run objective will be attained by increasing both the volume

5 B. 8 * Yamey, The Soonaoics of Resale Price Maintenance
(London,1954) p* 74.

6 See I>. A* Skeoch, "The Abolition of Resale Price Main
tenance: S«R@ Notes on Canadian Si^rience" Sconmica. Au^at
1964, pp. 268-9.
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of stock and the rate of turnover to their most efficient
points.

Both objectives require expansion of the retailers

sales, differing only In the degree of eaqpanslon.

This can

only be obtained by either stimulating demand In his segment
of the market or by extending his spatial market or more like
ly by a combination of both.
The effective method of accomplishing this Is by offering
lower prices.

The more substantial the reductions a retailer

can offer the greater will be the area from which he can at
tract customers.

To the consumer the saving must warrant the

additional time and travel involved plus the inconvenience in
changing shopping habits.
Soren Oammelgaard in commenting on this aspect writes:
Mail order houses, chain stores, department
stores, consumer co-operatives, super markets,
voluntary chains, self-service shops, dlsowbt
houses, and other new types of trading establish
ments have made their way to a large extent by
selling more oheaply than ordinal^ shops, and they
have generally been against resale price mainten
ance, at least during their formative years. The
fact that those forms are, as a rule, less de
veloped in Western Europe than in the United States
ffl€Cr have several causes, but the greater extent
of resale price maintenance In Europe may be one
of them.7
The uniform and inflexible price structure resulting from
resale price maintenance prevents distributors from seeking

7 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris,
1958), p. 66.
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Besides being denied

his own individual choice of price and service to be offered
the consumer, the distributor is prevented from changing or
differentiating his prices in such a way so as to influence
customers "to make purchases at those times, in those quan
tities and packages, and on those terms of delivery which in
cur the lowest costs for both parties”.^
Resale price maintenance tends then to hamper both the
development of more efficient retailing methods and the ex
pansion of the existing eff&cient outlets by removing the most
effective tool, price competition.
When a program of resale price maintenance is instigated
and more particularly when the initiative has come from re
tailers there will be a strong tendency to establish high mar
gins.

As the manufacturer will desire to obtain the widest

possible distribution for his product it is extremely likely
that he will fix margins at a level to allow a profit to high
cost retailers.
The ccxabination of potential high profits plus security
from price competition will tend to attract new entries into
the branches of retailing with general price maintenance.

This

will tend to reinforce the tendency to "excess capacity" which

8

Ibid.a p. 67.
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prevails In retailing as a consequence of the ease of entry.
Thus resale price maintenance contributes in two ways
to the inefficient use of resources In retailing.

First by

diverting coo^etitive energies from price coi^etitlon into
advertising and service competition it leads to undesired
use of resources.

Secondly, by attracting new retailers to

the scene it reinforces the tendency to "excess capacity" and
the resulting inefficient use of resources.
Competitive retailers may try to counteract the limita
tions on price competition imposed by resale price maintenance
by introducing their own brands.

But the products which are

price maintained are usually produced by well established
firms who have built up strong consumer preference.

This

fact may make it a lengthy and costly procedure to establish
acceptance and push the sale of a private brand.

Even where

this is done successfully the effect of price competition Is
lessened because of the difficulty faced by consumers in
assessing whether the difference in price reflects a 'better
buy* or a variation in quality.

The price level of the price

maintained brand will in the same vein influence the pidcing
of the private brand.
While retailers have been far more active than wholesalers
in persuading manufacturers to adopt resale price maintenance,
wholesalers have generally actively supported the retailers
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In their demands.9
The "Wholesalers motive is similar to that of the retailer,
the protection of profits and possible higher profits.

In

addition, the survival of the smaller independent retailer la
imperative to the continued existence of the wholesaler.
The growth of large retail organizations to the point
where their bargaining power enables them to buy direct from
the manufacturer threatens the very function of the wholesaler
while exerting pressures on his price structure.

Consequently

wholersalers will be influenced to join forces with retailers
in demanding resale price maintenance in order to hanper the
development of economic power among the larger retailers.
The effects of resale price maintenance on the function
of wholesaling will be similar to that on retailing.

Competi

tive forces will be diverted from price competition to compe
tition in services.

The development of more efficient methods

will be retarded and there will be a tendency for new entries
to be attracted into the field because of higher margins and
security from price competition.
Resale price maintenance increases distribution costa
initiially and subsequently Impedes the development of coat re
ducing methods.

By removing the spur of price competition it

9 See V, A, Mund, Government and Business. (New York,
1955), P. 464.
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slows down the pace of change in the distribution system.
The greater the difference in trading methods
in use at any one time, the greater the importance
which must be attached to a speedy replacement of
less efficient firms and methods by more efficient
ones, and the greater become the retarding effects
of resale price maintenance.10
Besides restricting the efforts of the competitive ele
ment of the distribution system resale price maintenance
penalizes the consumer.

Not only is the consumer required

to pay higher prices he is given no voice in deciding the
amount of distributive costs he may wish to pay.
The retailer is restricted on one hand from offering a
choice of alternatives between services and price and on the
other the consumer is restricted from making his choice and
thus influencing changes in the structure of retailing.

10 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris
1958), p. 67.
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CHAPTER VI

m Y HAHUPACqgRERS MAY DESIRE
RESALE PRICE HAINTSNANCE
In the early history of resale price maintenance it was
the small traditional retailer who advocated and can^aigned
for the adoption of the practice while manufacturers were some,
what reluctant to act.

More recently, particularly since the

end of World War II, it has been the manufacturer who has made
greater efforts to establish programs of resale price mainten
ance and who has been its most active supporter.

An excellent

example has been the efforts of electrical appliance manufac
turers in both the United States^ and Canada^.
In determining the motives which may induce manufacturers
to advocate resale price maintenance it has already been in
dicated that the desire of dealers and their association for
its adoption may be sufficient reason for the manufacturer,
as their eaiviest support la obviously to his benefit.

But

all retailers are not normally in favour of resale price main
tenance so the manufacturer will lose some support whatever

1 See Stewart Munro Lee, "Problems of Resale Price Main*
tenance". Journal of Marketing XXIII. (January, 1959) pp.

.

280

2 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Sellingj Re«
strictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p. 225.
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course he adopts.
On first examination, resale price maintenance would
appear to be against the interests of the manufacturer.

The

objective of the practice is to set the price at a minimum or
fixed level.

Once the factory price is established it would

be assumed that the manufacturer would generally desire to
have his product resold at as low a price as possible so that
the largest possible number of consumers could afford to pur
chase the product.

The smaller the resale margin, the larger

- other things being equal - the profits of the manufacturer
as his sales increase.
But price is not the only factor affecting the consumer’s
decision, particularly when there is a difficult c(xqparison
between a diversity of brands carxving various prices.

%e

manufacturer may find it more beneficial to Invest in sales
promotion and sell at somewhat higher prices.

The sales pro

motion may involve the use of advertising in an effort to try
and persuade the consumer in advance to ask for his brand or
it may involve an attempt to influence the consumer at the
very moment of purchase, or more likely, a combination of
both,

Ttie effective method of influencing the consumer at the

moment of purchase is to supply retailers with an incentive
to make a special sales effort in favour of the manufacturer’s
brand.

Resale price maintenance may appear as an aid to the
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manufacturer In making both types of sales promotion effective,
but particularly the latter.
% e tendency then will be to set the margin high in order
to ensure stocking of the product by even the high cost re
tailer and also to supply a strong incentive for preferential
treatment of the product by retailers.
The manufacturer who adopts a resale price will certainly
still be guided by rational motives in his selection.

The

price will be selected on the basis that it will likely give
the manufacturer the maximum profit in the long term.
But a manufacturer will not be inclined to adopt the
practice unless it is likely his competitors will do the same.
If heshould adopt resale price maintenance while his competi
tors do not his product becomes extremely vulnerable to price
competition at the retail level with the iB^lications for his
share of the maMcet.
In a trade where the sellers are kept fully
and promptly informed about the price-decisions
of their rivals, it may hs^pen, as has been seen,
that price-fluctuations will be damped down be
cause of prudent individual calculation and with
out collusion. In a prlce-leadership situation
this result occurs not because of the mutual can
niness of theimore-or-lesB equal competitors but
because one seller has a predominant position,
which others, if they are prudent, will not see
fit to challenge.3

3 A, D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States
of America. (London, i 960) p. 53.
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If the manufacturer is the dominant firm in the industry
and particularly if he has attained some cost advantages he
may be in a position to adopt resale price maintenance with
the result that other firms in the industry follow his lead.
In an industry where competitors are relatively equal in
power and resources the desire to adopt reaale price mainten
ance must usually be industry wide.

Even though the incentive

may come from strong retail organizations some agreement, tacit
or formal, is highly likely between manufacturers prior to
its adoption.
Although resale price maintenance is first and
foremost a method of abolishing price competition
among dealers it can also be a means of abolishing
or restricting oox^titlon among the producers
themselves and this may sometimes be the manufac
turer’s chief motive in adopting the system.*
Resale price maintenance tends to find support in indus
tries where there are relatively few companies, large in size,
producing well established products.

With the combination of

resale price maintenance on an industry wide basis and rela
tively few but large manufacturers, retail prices will tend
to settle at a ccxtsnon level either through agreement or price
leadership.
Price competition having been eliminated at the retail
level it has been argued that price competition will take place

4 Soren A, Gananelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance, (Paris,
1958) p.42.
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In other words the individual

manufacturer will tend to compete by offering a larger margin
on his product thus leading the retailer to promote his brand
more aggressively than a ccH^etltor’s brand.5
But If one manufacturer increases his margin this can
only result in pressure by retailers on the remaining manufac
turers in the industry to match or surpass the increase.

The

net result would tend to be a decreased return to all manufac
turers because of the increased margins.
% e action of wholesalers will follow a similar pattern.
As a result of the pressure from distributors or of fore
seeing the possibility of this pressure, the self interest of
the manufacturers through agreement or price leadership will
lead to uniformity of margins at the wholesale and retail level
with the resulting uniformity in factory prices*

With price

competition eliminated at all levels, the division of the mar
ket among the brands is left to depend upon such factors as
the reputation of different brands and the success of sales
promotion efforts.
The desire for resale price maintenance by an industry
may be the result of a horizontal agreement among manufacturers.

3 Manufacturers may argue that margins will tend to be
reduced because of price competition at the retail level when
prices are established. Supra, pp. 69*70 for rebuttal.
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Price competition at the retail level would tend to disrupt
the complete plan and make it unwo^able.
Another motive may be compensating protection for both
manufacturers and retailers.

Manufacturers protect dealers

from price ocmipetltion by establishing a program of resale
price maintenance.

‘Hie retailers, in return protect the manu

facturers through tacit agreement to purchase only from them
and not to buy from manufacturars without maintained prices.
% i s affords the manufacturer protection particularly from
new entries into the industry and those using competitive
selling methods.
The manufacturer may see in resale price maintenance a
method of keeping a favourable bargaining position.

Under the

system it is the manufacturer who sets the price and; margins
for his product, ensuring demand by use of advertising and
other sales promotion methods.

With his product distributed

through a large number of outlets, small and large, and a sub
stantial margin, he enjoys relative freedom from pressure by
retailers for prloe concessions, more particularly if agreement
or price leadership exists in the industry.
Without resale price maintenance, price coo^etltlon among
retailers will lead to constant pressure on their margins which,
sooner or later, will result in pressure on the manufacturer’s
prices and margins also.

Since price competition is likely to
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favour some of the larger and more aggreasive retailers their
bargaining strength will increase with their sales.
The development tends to follow closely that outlined
by J. K. Galbraith in his "Theory of Countervailing Power",^
Industries desiring resale price maintenance tend to have
characteristics of a few large sellers protected by difficulty
of entry and having accepted a convention against price com
petition.

"Power on one side of a market creates both the

need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of coun
tervailing power from the other side."^
Where no resale price maintenance exists, the large re
tailer may by aggressive price competition along with improved
merchandising methods obtain a substantial segment of the re
tail market for a product.

In the case of a chain store or a

department store, the share attained might be an important
portion of the individual manufacturer's production.
By threatening to buy elsewhere or to enter the manufac
turing field the retailer may be able to gain substantial price
concessions from the manufacturer who wishes to protect an
efficient production schedule.
The purpose of adopting resale price maintenance may be
designed to forestall or prevent such development of economic

6 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston
1956) pp. 108-34,
7

Ibid.. p. 113.
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Through Its use the manu

facturer is able to obtain wide distribution through many out
lets thus preventing or hindering the concentration of retail
sales with the large retailers.
Resale price maintenance may actually be more effective
Q
in controlling the lax%e retailer than his small competitor.
Small distributora generally can get awsqr with
a fair amount of price cutting, but large distributors
are under careful surveillance by the manufacturers
and rival f^tailers. Thus resale price maintenance
tends to favour the small distributor in two ways:
he cannot be undercut by the large distributor, and
he is left considerable rocxa in which to undercut
the large distributor.9
The manufacturers motive for desiring resale price main
tenance must be either to obtain an Increased profit or to
protect the present level of profits.

It would appear that he

is afforded the opportunity to do a little of both.
If there is a tendency to a horizontal agreement or price
leadership in the Industry, a price approaching the monopoly
level may be placed on the product with efforts directed at
establishing it as acceptable through constant advertising
associating the price with high quality.
There may be some tendency to a waste of resources as a

8 See S, R. Corey "Pair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal",
Harvard Business Review XXX. (September, 1952).
9 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market
Prices. (New York, 1951) p. 429,
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result of the legal and other costs of policing and enforcing
a system of resale price maintenance,^^

Constant policing

will be required if the system is to be effective and where
violations are encountered legal costs will be incurred on
both sides.
Finally, with the bargaining power of the large retailer
effectively checked and where the spur of price competition is
not effective the Incentive to pass on any cost savings result
ing from technological advancement or increased l^olume to the
consumer is very limited.

Such economies are likely to result

in the increased allocation of resources to sales promotion
efforts with the objective of increasing the market share.

10 See Stewart Munro Lee, "Problems of Resale Price Main
tenance". Journal of Marketing XXIII (Januaiy, 1959) pp. 274-

280.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this discussion has been to attespt to
establish whether resale price maintenance does or does not
serve the public interest.

In assessing the practice the two

major considerations have been the implications for the con
sumer and for the efficiency of the economic system.^
The history of the origins of resale price maintenance
indicate a similarity in early development in the United King
dom, the United States and Canada.

The threat of new types of

retail outlets to the position of the small traditional retail
er forced him to seek methods of counteracting this competition,
Department and chain stores were cutting into the trade
of the small retailer through price c^xipetition.

The increase

of branded and trade-maz^ced merchandise contributed to further
competition across product lines.

As a means of improving

their competitive position small retailers joined together to
f o m trade associations which proceeded to negotiate with
manufacturers and to persuade some to adopt resale prloe

1 Within the limitations and qualifications regarding
restrictions on competition and price ccmtpetition mentioned
above. Supra., p. 4,

77
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maintenance.
In the United Kingdom the practice became fairly wide
spread, having been estimated to aaount to thirty percent of
the public’s expenditure on consumer goods in 1938.2

There

was no legislation dealing with resale price maintenance until

1956 when horizontal resale price agreements were ruled illegal.
Individual resale price maintenance was finally prohib
ited with the passing of "Tho Resales Prices Act" in 1964.
Suppliers of goods were allowed to apply for exemption from
the statutory proî?lbition with the provision that resale price
maintenance could be continued until the ccwrt rendered a
decision,

A substantial number of applications were submitted

and despite the fact that an increasing number of applications
are being withdrawn it appears it may be several years before
the Court renders decisions on the many applications remalnlng.3
In the United States the period prior to the 1930‘s was
notable for the uncertainity of the legal position of resale
price maintenance.

The practice was first made legal for

intrastate commerce in California in 1931,

% e passage of the

Miller-Tydinga Act in 1937 legalized resale price maintenance
in interstate commerce where commodities were shipped into

2 See Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance
(Lloyd Jacob Report) (London, 1949) p. Î,
3

See the Economist July 3# 1965, p. 58,
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states where it was legal under state law.

Within two years

the number of states with "Fair Trade" laws increased from
fourteen to forty-five.
Tirte Sohuegmann decision in 1951 invalidating the C o n 
signer'' clause caused a collapse of resale price maintenance
in interstate trade and severe price coa^etition developed.
The McGuire Act of the next year restored the "non-signer"
clause but the reprieve for the practice was only temporary.
The increasing abundance of goods and the resulting sharp
ening of competition contributed to increasing violation of
resale price maintenance.

The evolution of the large discount

store offering a wide variety of merchandise on a cash and
carry basis was a major factor in the increasing ccmipetition.
The large discount stores in order to develop the require)
market out prices substantially on a large cross section of
merchandise involving also price maintained articles.

This

coupled with price cutting by some smsCLl retailers on price
maintained goods forced the large chains and department stores
to put constant pressure on manufacturers to discipline the
price cutters.

The resulting heavily increased costs of

policing resale price maintenance agreements ultimately induced
a large number of manufacturers to abandon the practice.

Al

though some resale price maintenance still exists in the United
States the practice does not appear to be significant in
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distribution policies.
In Canada, resale price maintenance attracted little
attention or comment prior to World War II although in two in
vestigations it was found that it was detrimental to public
interest.

The uncertainity of the legal position of resale

price maintenance during this period may account for the in
frequent reference to the practice.
Following World War II the use of resale price maintenance
increased leading to the investigation of the MacQuarrie Com
mittee.

As a result, in December, 1931, the practice, and any

attempt to enforce it, were made illegal.

In I960 an amendment

was passed which allows a manufacturer to refuse to sell to
anyone who uses his product as a loss-leader, which is defined
as selling the article not for the purpose of making a profit
but for the purpose of advertising or of attracting customers
to his store.

Sales may also be withheld if the dealer is

making a practice of engaging in misleading advertising in
respect of the product or failing to provide the level of ser
vicing that purchasers might reasonably expect.
This amendment tends to weaken the legislation as manu
facturers appear to be now in a position to exert some pressure
on retailers in an effort to establish a minimum retail price.
Although designed to eliminate the "loss-leader" complaint it
does not appear to have been sufficient in view of the Canadian
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Appliance Manufacturers Association*a plan to present a brief
to the government later this year requesting "some pricing
control".*
Although developments in all three countries have followed
somewhat different paths, the apparent destinations appear to
be the same, the eventual elimination of resale price mainten
ance.

Can«3a, as a result of a recommendation from an investi

gation into increasing prices,5 conducted a public inquiry into
the practice leading to its banning In 1951.

Tho United King

dom legislation of 1964 similarly resulted from public enquir
ies into the use of the practice.

The gradual abandonment of

its use in the United States appears to have been caused in
part by the increasing aggressiveness of both new and old re
tailers^ and in part by the differences and inconsistencies of
Federal and State Legislation.
Resale price maintenance originated with the small retail
ers* efforts to gain protection from the price competition of
new types of retail outlets.

This has continued to be the

prime motive of that segment of the retailing industry which

4 See "Some Pricing Control Will be Requested by Appliance
Manufacturers". The Globe and Mail. August 6, 1965, p. Bl,
5 See Report of Royal Commission on Price. I, (Ottawa,
1949), p. 41.
6 See L, A. Skeoch, "The Abolition of Resale Price Main
tenance: Some Notes on Canadian Experience", Economics, August
1964, p. 269.
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has continued to support the practice.
Resale price maintenance also may afford retailers a m e a m
of obtaining a horizontal price-fixing agreement where manufac
turers are willing or can be persuaded to require that their
product be sold by all retailers at the same price.

It is actu

ally more effective than a horizontal agreement among retailers
because of the ability of the manufacturer to take action
against violators of the agreement.
The practice tends to restrict competition at the retail
level with its implications for the consumer and for the use
of resources.

Its effects upon the structure of retailing tend

to be retardative in nature,
Resale price maintenance protects the non-aggressive re
tailer, particularly the inefficient and marginal iterator, and
increases the costs of distribution by the tendency to increase
service costs, to increase excess capacity in retailing and to
hamper the evolution of more efficient retailing methods and
economies of scale in retailing establishments.
With price competition prevented or limited by the practice,
competitive energies are directed Into advertising and service
channels with a resulting increase to retailing costs.

Easy ored>

it, free delivery, elaborate store furnishings, costly displays
are all used in varying degrees in an effort to stimulate buying.
The high margins resulting from the manufacturers’ need
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to provide a profit to high coat retailers, with their sugges
tion of an opportunity to earn better than average profits
will tend to draw new entries into retailing.

This will re

inforce the tendency of the retail industry to develop "excess
capacity" as a result of ease of entry.
The elimination of price competition removes the major
incentive to the development of less costly retailing methods.
The retailer is prevented from using any savings effected by
moT*e efficient methods to reduce prices with the view of ex
panding his sales in an effort to gain further reductions of
costs.

He is precluded from varying his margins in an effort

to find the turnover which produces the maximum profit.

By

losing the use of price competition both to stimulate demand
and to extend his spatial market the retailer is hampered in
attaining economies of scale over the long run.
The growth of economic power in the retailing field should
not be a concern unless it is likely to result in a tendency
to monopoly.

The present trends in retailing do not indicate

any such tendency in view of the continued survival of the
small retailer and the keen competition between the various
types of retailing.?

7 See John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston
1956), p. 118 for a discussion of the position of the large
retailer.
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The threat from economic power in retailing to the manu
facturers' margins undoubtedly supplied one of the motives for
manufacturers* strong support of resale price maintenance in
recent years.

Resale price maintenance assists manufacturers

in retaining the major role in the setting of prices by two
Influences.

On one hand the practice hampers the development

of economic power in retailing by retarding market expansion
by the retailer.

On the other hand it tends to counteract the

impact of economic power in retailing by ensuring the manufac
turer the use of a relatively large and possibly, excessively
large number of outlets.

This enables the manufacturer to

better resist pressure from the large retailers.
Resale price maintenance also may enable manufacturers to
eliminate pressures on their margins from another source.

Where

resale price maintenance is introduced Into an industry it will
tend to be adopted industry wide.

If the practice is to persist

a common retail price level will likely result prompting uni
formity in retail and wholesale maxrgins and the resulting sim
ilarity in factory prices.
Conversely, where a horizontal agreement exists between
manufacturers, resale price maintenance supplies a natural sup
plement to the arrangement.

It prevents retail price competi

tion and its disturbing effects upon both msirket shares and
manufacturers* faith In their competitors* adherence to the
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horizontal agreement.
Resale price maintenance could be the main basis for
agreements between manufacturers and retailers for their mu
tual protection.

The manufacturers implementation of price

maintenance protects the retailers from price competition.
In exchange retailers tacitly agree to buy only from the manu
facturers concerned and not to buy from manufacturers without
a resale price maintenance policy.

The manufacturer receives

some protection from both new entries Into the industry and
those manufacturers using more competitive selling methods.
It would appear that resale price maintenance offers manu
facturers an opportunity to prevent pressure on their margins
from two possible sources.

By both impeding and providing a

possible defense against economic power in retailing the prac
tice limits the pressure from the other aide of the market,
the retailers, on manufacturers' profit margins.

Either as a

means to or a supplement to horizontal agreements resale price
maintenance can be used as a means of preventing pressure on
manufacturers' margins through price competition at the facto#
level.
The manufacturers’ requests for protection frmm the socalled "loss-leader" practice are attempts designed toward ob
taining some type of price control at the retail level.

The

inability to arrive at a clear cut definition of a "loss-leader"
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plus the lack of proof thatt manufaoturers » aalea are In any
way detrimentally affected by loss-leader competition tends
to lead to a rejection of the argument.

Any legislation

designed to control loss-leadess, such as the Canadian Amend
ment of I960, will tend to create a situation in which manu
facturers will be able to influence minimum resale prices.
Any benefits claimed for the consumer from the practice
have failed to be substantiated.
penalised in several ways.

The consumer is actually

He is forced to pay a higher price

than he might otherwise have to pay if price competition were
present because of the resulting higher margins at both the
retail and wholesale level plus the possibility of excessive
margins at the manufacturing level.

In addition the consumer

la made to pay for services that he may not desire.

He is

denied the choice of a corresponding reduction in price in
lieu of the services.

The very denial of this choice severely

restricts the consumers* influence on the distribution system
and hence the development of more efficient methods of distri
bution with their Implication for lower prices.
The inefficient use of resources may occur in both distri
bution and manufacturing as a result of resale price maintenance.
At both the retail and wholesale level the elimination of
price competition will tend to result In the greater absorption
of resources into services.

The higher guaranteed margins
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will attract new f i m a Involving unneeded resources Into areas
which already have a tendency to excess capacity.

While pro

viding protection for the high coat marginal operator the prac
tice at the same time will hai^er the development of the more
efficient use of resources in distribution.

The net result

is to draw a greater portion of the national resources into
distribution than would be necessary under price competition.
At the manufacturing level resale price maintenance may
result in or perform as an aid to a non-competitive price
structure.

Competitive energies of manufacturers will then

tend to be diverted to advertising and sales prcxmotion on a
larger scale than under price coo^etltlon.

This coupled with

the cost of policing resale price maintenance will tend to
increase manufacturers' costs.

In addition any decreases In

production costs resulting fraa technological improvement or
increased volume are likely to be used for greater sales pro
motion as opposed to being passed on as price reductions as
might be the case under price competition.
Resale price maintenance sqipears to be a restrictive prac
tice which does not serve the public interest.

By contributing

to non-ooi^etitive price structures at all levels it tends to
divert competitive efforts to increased and excessive distri
bution services with the resulting Inefficient use of resources.
By eliminating price compétition it retards the development of
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more efficient methods of distribution with their implications
for lower prices.
Resale price maintenance through higher prices forces
the consumer to assume the burden of higher distribution costs,
to subsidize inefficient distributors and to contribute to
higher profits of manufacturers.
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APPENDIX

THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT
Part V. Sections 33 and 34
33.

Every person who is a party or privy to or kn<M#lngly

assists in, or In the formation of, a merger or monopoly la
guilty of an Indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment
for two years.

Merger and monopoly are defined in Subsection 2(e) and 2(f)
respectively of the Act as follows:
"merger” means the acquisition by one or more persons,
whether by purchase or lease of shares or assets or
otherwise, of any control over or^lnterest in the
whole or part of the business of a competitor, sup
plier, customer or any other trade person, whereby
competition
(i) in a trade or industry,
(ii) among the sources of supply of a trade or
industry
(ill) among the outlets for sales of a trade or
Industry, or
(iv) otherwise than in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and

(ill).

is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or
against the Interest of the public, whether consumers,
producers or others;
"monopoly" means a situation where one or more per
sons either substantially or completely control
throughout Canada or (my area thereof the class or
species of business in which they are engaged and
have operated such business or are likely to operate
it to the detriment or against the interest of the
public, whether consumers, producers or others, but
a situation shall not be deemed a monopoly within
the meaning of this paragraph by reason only of the
89
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the exercise of any right or enjoyment of any inter
est derived under the Patent Act, or any other Act
of the Parliament of Canada - Editors)
33A. (1) Every one engaged in a business who
(a) is a party or privy to, or assists in, any sale that
discriminates to his knowledge, directly or indirect
ly, against competitors of a purchaser of articles
from him in that any discount, rebate, allowance,
price concession or other advantage is granted to the
purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allow
ance, price concession or other advantage that, at
the time the articles are sold to such purchaser,
is available to such competitors in respect of a
sale of articles of like quality and quantity;
(b) engages in a policy of selling articles in any area
of Canada at prices lower than those exacted by him
elsewhere in Canada, having the effect or tendency
of substantially lessening competition or elimina
ting a competitor in such part of Canada, or de
signed to have such effect; or
(c) engages in a policy of selling articles at prices
unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of
substantially lessening competition or eliminating
a competitor, or designed to have such effect.
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison
ment for two years.
(2) It is not an offence under paragraph (a) subsection
(1) to be a party or privy to, or assist in any sale mentioned
therein unless the discount, rebate, allowance, price conces
sion or other advantage was granted as part of a practice of
discriminating as described in that paragraph.
(3) ihe provisions of paragraph (a) of aubeection (I)
shall not be construed to prohibit a co-operative society from
returning to producers or consumers, or a co-operative whole
sale society from returning to its constituent retail or whole
sale members, the whole or any part of the net surplus made in
its trading operations in proportion to purchases made from or
sales made to the society.*
* Section 33A of the Combines Investigation Act was Section
412 of the Criminal Code prior to the I960 amendment to the Act
- Editors.
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33B. (1) In this section "allowance" means any discount, re
bate, price concession or other advantage that is or purports
to be offered or granted for advertising or display purposes
and is collateral to a sale or sales of articles but is not
applied directly to the selling price.
(2) Every one engaged in a business who is a party or
privy to the granting of an allowance to any purchaser that
is not offered on proportionate terms to other purchasers in
competition with the first-mentioned purchaser (which other
purchasers are in this section called "competing purchasers"),
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison
ment for two years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, an allowance is
offered on proportionate terms only if
(a) the allowance offered to a purchaser is in
approximately the same proportion to the
value of sales to him as the allowance of
fered to each competing purchaser is to the
total value of sales to such coi^eting pur
chaser,
(b) in any case where advertising or other ex
penditures or services are exacted in return
therefor, the cost therof requiz>ed to be
incurred by a purchaser is in approximately
the same proportion to the value of sales to
him as the cost of such advertising or other
expenditures or services required to be in
curred by each competing purchaser Is to the
total value of sales to such competing pur
chaser, and
(c) in any case where services are exacted in
return therfor, the requirements thereof
have regard to the kinds of services that
competing purchasers at the same or differ
ent levels of distribution are ordinarily
able to perform or cause to be performed.
33C. (1) Every one who, for the purpose of piwmoting the sale
or use of an article, makes any materially misleading repre
sentation to the public, by any means whatever, concerning the
price at which such or like articles have been, are or will be,
ordinarily sold, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
conviction.
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(2) Subsection (I) does not apply to a person who pub
lishes an advertisement that he accepts in good faith for
publication in the ordinary course of his business.
34. (1) In this section "dealer" means a person engaged in the
business of manufacturing or supplying or selling any article
or ccKnmodity.
(2) No dealer shall directly or indirectly by agreement,
threat, promise or any other means whatsoever, require or
induce or atteogpt to require or induce any other person to re
sell an article or commodity
(a) at a price specified by the dealer or established
by agreement,
(b) at a price not less than a minimum price specified
by the dealer or established by agreement,
(c) at a markup or discount specified by the dealer or
established by agreement,
(d) at a markup not less than a minimum markup specified
by the dealer or established by agreement, or
(e) at a discount not greater than a maximum discount
specified by the dealer or established by agreement,
whether such maztoip or discount or minimum markup or
maximum discount is esqpressed as a percentage or other
wise.
(3) No dealer shall refuse to sell or supply an article or
commodity to any other person for the reason thatzrsuch other
person
(a) has reused to resell or to offer for resale the art
icle or coBwodity
(i) at a price specified by the dealer or estab
lished by agreement,
(ii) at a price not leas than a minimum price
specified by the dealer or established by
agreement,
(ill) at a markup or discount specified by the
dealer or established by agreement,
(iv) at a markup not less than a minimum markup
specified by the dealer or established by
agreement, or
(v) at a discount not greater than a maximum
discount specified by the dealer or estab
lished by agreement3 or
(b) has resold or offered to resell the article or
commodity
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(1) at a price less than a price or minimum price
specified by the dealer or established by
agreement,
(ii) at a markup less than a markup or minimum
mazicup specified by the dealer or established
by agre«nent, or
(ill) at a discount greater than a discount or maxi
mum discount specified by the dealer or estab
lished by agreement.
(4) Eveiy person who violates subsection (2) or (3) is
guilty of an indictable offence and is liable on conviction to
a fine in the discretion of the court or to Imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years or to both, 1951 (2nd Sess.),
o. 30, s. 1; 1952, c. 39# ». 4.
(5 ) Where# in a prosecution under this section# It is
proved that the person charged refused or counselled the re
fusal to sell or supply an article to any other person# no
inference unfavourable to the person charged shall be drawn
from such evidence if he satisfies the court that he and any
one upon whose %'eport he depended had reasonable cause to
believe and did believe
(a) that the other person was making a practice of
using articles supplied by the person charged
as loss-leaders# that is to say# not for the
purpose of making a profit thereon but for pur
poses of advertisings
(b) that the other person was making a practice of
using articles supplied by the person charged
not for the purpose of selling such articles at
a profit but for the purpose of attracting custCHners to his store in the hope of selling them
other articles;
(c) that the other person was making a practice of
engaging in misleading advertising in respect
of articles supplied by the person charged; or
(d) that the other person made a practice of not
providing the level of servicing that purchasers
of such articles might reasonably expect from
such other person.
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